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Abstract
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission), established 
by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), is a quasi-
judicial regional body charged with the functions of promoting and protecting human 
rights in Africa, including economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights. The Commission 
was the third regional human rights body after the European and American regional 
bodies. It is empowered to ‘interpret’ Africa’s key regional human rights treaty, the 
African Charter adopted in 1981. Although the African Charter protects ESC rights 
alongside other rights, the African Commission noted in its Resolution on ESC Rights 
in Africa, ACHPR /Res.73(XXXVI)04 (2004), that ‘despite the consensus on the 
indivisibility of human rights, economic, social and cultural rights remain marginalised 
in their implementation’ in Africa. The Commission observed that there is inadequate 
recognition by African States of this category of rights that results in the continued 
marginalisation of these rights, which ‘excludes the majority of Africans from the full 
enjoyment of human rights’. Not surprisingly, the Commission has found several States 
in violations of ESC rights. One contributory cause for the continued marginalisation 
of this category of rights in Africa can be attributed to the lack of awareness of the 
Commission’s jurisprudence on these rights. This article reviews selected key aspects in 
the Commission’s jurisprudence on ESC rights since the Commission was inaugurated 
in 1987 focusing on the normative content; State obligations and obligations of non-
State Actors; remedies and limitations to and derogations from ESC rights.
* Senior lecturer in law, Brunel law School, Brunel university, london. All internet sources were 
last visited on 19 July 2011.
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1. INTRoDuCTIoN
27 June 2011 marked the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter or ACHPR).1 The African Charter 
is widely known as the first international human rights treaty to protect the three 
‘generations’ of human rights, including civil and political rights; economic, social, 
and cultural (ESC) rights; and group and peoples’ rights, in a single instrument, 
without drawing any distinction between the justiciability or implementation of the 
three ‘generations’ of rights. Despite this achievement, only a modest number of ESC 
rights were explicitly included in the African Charter due to a ‘minimalist’ approach 
adopted during its drafting, which, at the time, was in line with the notion ‘to spare 
[…] young states too many but important obligations’.2 Thus, the African Charter 
only explicitly recognises the following individual ESC rights: the right to property 
(Article 14); the right to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions (Article 15); 
the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health (Article 16); 
the right to education (Article 17(1)); and, the protection of the family and cultural 
rights (Articles 17(2) and (3), 18(1) and (2) and 61). The Charter also protects some 
group rights in Articles 19–24, including the rights to self-determination, free disposal 
of wealth and natural resources, economic, social and cultural development, national 
and international peace and security, and a general satisfactory environment. most of 
these rights may be seen, at least in part, as collective ESC rights.
Among the individual ESC rights, which are fundamental for human survival 
and for living a life of dignity, explicitly protected in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),3 but not explicitly included in the 
African Charter are the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing; social security; and the right to the continuous improvement of 
living conditions. Further the rights to rest, leisure, reasonable limitation of working 
hours, periodic holidays with pay, remuneration for public holidays and the right 
to form and join trade unions are not explicitly protected.4 The rights to water and 
sanitation are also not explicitly protected in the Charter. Relatively more detailed 
ESC rights are protected in later African human rights treaties protecting specific 
more vulnerable groups – children, women, the youth and internally displaced 
1 oAu Doc. CAB/lEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 Ilm 58 (1982), ratified by 53 member States of the African 
union. For a discussion see generally Evans, m.D. and murray, R. (eds), The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986–2006, Cambridge university Press, 
Cambridge, 2nd ed, 2008; and ouguergouz, F., The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
A Comprehensive Agenda for Human for Human Dignity and Sustainable Development in Africa, 
Kluwer law International, The Hague, 2003.
2 See Rapporteur’s Report on the Draft ACHPR, oAu Doc CAB/lEG/67/Draft Rapt. (II) Rev.4, para. 
13; Viljoen, F., International Human Rights Law in Africa, ouP, oxford, 2007, p. 238.
3 993 uNTS 3, entered into force 3 January 1976, Articles 6–15. The vast majority of African uN 




persons – in particular the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child;5 
the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa (African Women’s Protocol);6 the African Youth Charter;7 and 
the African union (Au) Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally 
Displaced Persons.8
Thus, so far, in its growing ‘case law’ the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) has most frequently dealt with civil and political 
rights such as the right to fair trial, freedom of speech and freedom from torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment.9 This is partly because most communications 
brought before the Commission by civil society actors, such as NGos, have mostly 
raised issues relating to civil and political rights. only a few ESC rights cases have 
been brought before the Commission. This is despite the fact that many individuals 
and more vulnerable groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly the inhabitants 
of rural and deprived urban areas; landless persons; women; children; households 
headed by women; families living with HIV/AIDS; persons with disabilities; refugees 
and internally displaced persons, still live in (extreme) poverty.10 This leads to wide 
spread denials and violations of ESC rights. For example in 2009 in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) 75 percent of the population lived in extreme poverty, 83 
percent of the population had no access to safe drinking water, while 70 percent had 
5 oAu Doc. CAB/lEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 29 November 1999. See, for example, 
Articles 11 (right to education); 12 (leisure, recreation and cultural activities); 14 (right to health); 
15 (protection against child labour); 18 (protection of the family); and 21 (protection from harmful 
social and cultural practices).
6 Adopted by the 2nd ordinary Session of the African union Assembly, maputo, 11 July 2003, 
entered into force 25 November 2005, available at: www.achpr.org/english/_info/women_en.html. 
The Protocol protects ESC rights in Articles 12 (education and training); 13 (economic and social 
welfare rights); 14 (health and reproductive rights); 15 (food security); 16 (adequate housing); and 17 
(positive cultural context). The Protocol provides for special protection for elderly women, women 
with disabilities and women in distress in Articles 22–24.
7 Adopted by the African union Assembly in July 2006, available at: www.africa-union.org/root/
ua/conferences/mai/hrst/charter%20english.pdf. The Charter protects several rights including 
property (Article 9); education (Article 13); freedom from poverty (Article 14); employment 
(Article 15); health (Article 16) and culture (Articles 20 and 25).
8 Adopted by the Special Summit of the union held in Kampala, 23 october 2009, available at: www.
au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_uNIoN_CoNVENTIoN_FoR_THE_PRoTECTIoN_
AND_ASSISTANCE_oF_INTERNAllY_DISPlACED_PERSoNS_IN_AFRICA_(KAmPAlA_
CoNVENTIoN).pdf. under Article 3(b) States undertake to: ‘Prevent political, social, cultural and 
economic exclusion and marginalisation, that are likely to cause displacement of populations or 
persons by virtue of their social identity, religion or political opinion’.
9 By November 2010 the Commission had published around 150 decisions of which slightly less 
than half were inadmissibility decisions. Decisions of the African Commission are reported in 
the Activity Reports of the African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights, available at: www.
interights.org/ACHPR_reports/index.htm.
10 See uNDP, Human Development Report 2010: The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human 
Development (New York, uNDP, 2010) pp. 86, 97–98.
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no access to hygienic sanitation facilities and only 1 percent of the population had 
access to electricity.11
While life expectancy at birth in the year 2010 in some non-African States (such as 
Norway, Australia, Canada, Sweden, Japan, Switzerland, France, Iceland and Spain) 
was over 80 years, in several States that are party to the African Charter (such as 
Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, lesotho, mali, Nigeria, 
Sierra leone, and Zimbabwe) it was below 50 years.12 Fifty percent of the 536,000 
women who die every year due to complications during pregnancy, childbirth or the 
six weeks following delivery occur in Sub-Saharan Africa, with unsafe abortion as 
one of the major causes.13 Despite this poor state of ESC rights in Africa, the African 
Commission has given prominence to civil and political rights as evident in the 
Commission’s promotional activities. For example, in two general resolutions about 
the ‘human rights situation in Africa’ adopted in 1994 and 1999 the Commission 
expressed concern mainly on ‘civil and political’ rights.14 The Commission’s recent 
(march 2011) resolutions on the ‘human rights situation’ in North Africa in particular 
in Algeria,15 libyan Arab Jamahiliya,16 and Tunisia17 do not refer specifically to 
respect for ESC rights. Nonetheless, the Commission has developed some useful 
jurisprudence on ESC rights in the thirty years of the Charter African Charter (1981–
2011) and 25 years since the African Charter entered into force on 21 october 1986.
This article reviews the evolution and impact of the African Commission’s 
jurisprudence on ESC rights under the African Charter. The article adopts the 
following structure. Section 2 provides an overview of ESC rights explicitly 
protected in the African Charter and the interpretation of these rights by the African 
Commission. It also considers the impact of the Commission’s jurisprudence. Section 
3 considers the African Commission’s emerging jurisprudence on State obligations 
with respect to ESC right and also considers the Commission’s approach to the non-
State actor obligations under the African Charter. Section 4 makes several concluding 
observations.
11 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Democratic Republic of Congo, uN Doc. E/C.12/CoD/Co/4 
(16 December 2009), para. 29.
12 uNDP, op.cit. note 10, pp. 143–146.
13 united Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2009, New York, united Nations, 2009, 
p. 26.
14 See Resolution on the situation of Human Rights in Africa, ACHPR /Res.14(XVI)94, (1994); 
Resolution on the Human Rights situation in Africa, ACHPR /Res.40(XXVI)99, (1999). However, 
the 1994 Resolution acknowledged that ‘the human rights situation in many African countries is 
characterised by the violations of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights’ and called 
upon ‘all African Governments to adopt legislative and other measures to protect vulnerable groups 
of society, in particular women and children, against the consequences of the persistent economic 
crisis in Africa’.
15 ACHPR/Res.180(Ext.oS/IX)2011 (1 march 2011).
16 ACHPR/Res.181(Ext.oS/IX)2011 (1 march 2011).
17 ACHPR/Res.178(Ext.oS/IX)2011 (1 march 2011).
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2. ClARIFYING THE NoRmATIVE CoNTENT oF ESC 
RIGHTS uNDER THE AFRICAN CHARTER
This section begins by making a brief consideration of the provisions of the African 
Charter protecting ESC rights. It is observed that these provisions are broadly framed 
and require innovative interpretation to enable State Parties to the African Charter 
to implement ESC rights. The section then considers the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission on ESC rights developed before 2001. It is observed that the Commission’s 
jurisprudence before 2001, as reflected in its decisions, despite finding violations of 
ESC rights, generally tends to be very fact specific. The Commission thereby failed to 
develop the normative content of ESC rights under the African Charter. This was due 
to the failure of the African Commission to give due attention to the interpretation 
of the relevant provisions protecting ESC rights. The section ends by examining the 
Commission’s jurisprudence from 2001 up to 2010 noting that the Commission has 
increasingly paid attention to developing the general normative content of ESC rights 
under the African Charter mainly through the use of international human rights law. 
However, more consistency is still required.
2.1. oVERVIEW oF ESC RIGHTS EXPlICITlY PRoTECTED IN THE 
AFRICAN CHARTER: THE VAGuE FoRmulATIoN oF ESC 
RIGHTS
Although the African Charter protects ESC rights, it does so in very general and 
extremely vague terms. For example, regarding the right to property, Article 14 
provides that ‘[t]he right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached 
upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and 
in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws’. Apart from the fact that the 
content of the right to property and its beneficiaries are not defined in Article 14, the 
permissible restrictions – references to ‘public need’ or the ‘general interest of the 
community’ – are broadly framed. There is no explicit mention of ‘prompt, effective 
and adequate compensation’ prior to the compulsory deprivation of property.
Similarly, in protecting the right to work Article 15 simply provides: ‘Every 
individual shall have the right to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions, 
and shall receive equal pay for equal work’. It does not define the content of ‘equitable 
and satisfactory conditions’. Does this include, for example, the rights to rest, leisure, 
reasonable limitation of working hours, periodic holidays with pay, remuneration for 
public holidays and the right to form and join trade unions including the right to 
strike?
Article 16, which protects the right to health, reads: ‘Every individual shall have 
the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health’. It then 
obliges State Parties to take the ‘necessary measures’ to protect the health of their 
Analysing the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Jurisprudence of the African Commission
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 29/3 (2011) 363
people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick. Clearly, 
Article 16 neither defines the content of the right to the ‘best attainable state of physical 
and mental health’ nor does it indicate the specific measures States are required to 
undertake to implement this right.
Article 17(1), which protects the right to education, only provides: ‘Every individual 
shall have the right to education’. unlike Article 13 of the ICESCR, which elaborates 
on the content of the right to education, the content of the right to education in the 
African Charter that ‘every individual’ is entitled to enjoy was not defined at all. The 
general character of this provision leaves more questions than answers. Does Article 
17 guarantee access to pre-school education, the right to free and compulsory primary 
education to all, a right to have secondary education generally available and accessible 
to all and a right to the accessibility of higher education on the basis of capacity? The 
objectives of education are also not stated. Clearly then, such a general formulation 
of the right to education requires interpretation by the Commission (and the African 
Court) to enable States to give effect to their obligations.
With respect to cultural rights Articles 17(2) of the African Charter provides that: 
‘Every individual may freely, take part in the cultural life of his community’. The 
scope of ‘cultural life’ that ‘every individual’ may make a choice to take part in is not 
defined. In sum, all the above provisions on ESC rights lack specificity and require 
innovative interpretation in the light of present-day conditions to enable State Parties 
to understand their obligations under the African Charter. Creativity and dynamism 
in the Commission’s interpretation of the African Charter giving meaning to ESC 
rights are essential if States are to give effect to the object and purpose of the African 
Charter, which is to ‘promote and protect human and peoples’ rights and freedoms’ 
effectively in Africa.18 This creative interpretation would contribute considerably 
to the clarification and development of ESC rights. In turn this would enable States 
Parties to implement the relevant ESC rights. Indeed the broad and vague wording 
was designed to permit a degree of ‘flexibility’ in the application and subsequent 
interpretation of the African Charter by the competent bodies.19
2.2. THE INTERPRETATIoN oF ESC RIGHTS BY THE AFRICAN 
CommISSIoN
The African Commission met for the first inaugural session on 2 November 1987. 
The Commission did not have a permanent Secretariat after its inauguration and 
only became fully functional in June 1989. It comprises 11 commissioners, elected 
by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government for six-year terms and serving in 
18 African Charter, supra note 1, preamble, para. 11.
19 See Report of the Rapporteur, oAu ministerial meeting on the Draft African Charter on Human 




their personal capacity.20 The Commission, as a part-time body, meets for two annual 
sessions of fifteen days each, in addition to which extraordinary sessions may be held. 
The specific functions of the Commission are to promote human and peoples’ rights; 
to ensure the protection of human and peoples’ rights; and to provide authoritative 
interpretation of the African Charter and its Protocol on the Rights of Women.21
There are two main ways through which the Commission can directly develop the 
normative content of ESC rights under the African Charter. The first method is for the 
Commission to provide an interpretation of the African Charter clarifying the scope 
of ESC rights in accordance with Article 45(3) of the African Charter. This Article 
states that one of the functions of the Commission is to interpret all the provisions 
of the Charter at the request of a State Party, an institution of the African union 
(Au) or an African organisation recognised by the Au. Although, as noted above, 
most of the provisions of the African Charter protecting ESC rights are stated in very 
general terms, no State Party to the Charter, Au institution or an African organisation 
recognised by the Au has (as of 27 June 2011) ever requested the Commission to 
interpret any of the Charter’s provisions on ESC rights.22 This is not surprising given 
the lack of interest in implementing ESC rights by many African States. For example, 
in spite of the significant economic growth and huge natural wealth in some African 
States and the international development aid that has been provided, the amount of 
resources allocated to social services and public infrastructure is far from adequate.23 
Arguably, in interpreting the Charter the Commission may on its own motion make 
resolutions, statements, general comments, concluding observations on State Party 
reports, principles or guidelines clarifying the content of the rights protected in the 
Charter.24
20 African Charter, supra note 1, Articles 31–34.
21 Ibidem, Article 45; African Women’s Protocol, supra note 6, Articles 26(1) and 32.
22 At the time of writing this competence had been used only on one occasion resulting into an 
Advisory opinion which concluded that the draft of the uN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, GA Res. 61/295, uN Doc. A/RES/47/1 (2007), was compatible with the African Charter. 
See Advisory opinion of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the united 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the African Commission at 
its 41st ordinary session, Accra, Ghana, may 2007, available at: www.achpr.org/english/Special%20
mechanisms/Indegenous/Advisory%20opinion_eng.pdf.
23 See, for example, Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights for Angola, uN Doc. uN Doc. E/C.12/AGo/C/o/3/CRP.1 (18 November 2008), para. 26; 
Democratic Republic of Congo, uN Doc. E/C.12/CoD/Co/4 (16 December 2009), para 16; Chad, uN 
Doc. E/C.12/TCD/Co/3uN Doc. (16 December 2009), para. 23.
24 See e.g. Resolution on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights in Africa, ACHPR /Res.73(XXXVI)04, 
(2004); Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, in Second Annual Activity Report of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 1988–1989, ACHPR/RPT/2nd, Annex XII; Draft Principles 
and Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (Draft Principles and Guidelines), adopted by the African Commission at the 48th 
session, in November 2010, available at: www.achpr.org/english/other/Draft_guideline_ESCR/
Draft_Pcpl%20&%20Guidelines.pdf.
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The second method is for the Commission to clarify the normative content of 
ESC rights through the consideration of complaints (‘communications’). Complaints 
alleging human rights violations may be submitted to the Commission from 
States and non-State actors (NSAs) including individuals and non-government 
organisations (NGos) without States having made a separate declaration to this 
effect.25 Complainants are not required to be victims or to show that they act with 
the explicit consent of victims.26 Complainants are also allowed to bring an actio 
popularis (a complaint in the public interest).27 However, inter-State communications 
are less effective because States have not alleged violations under other human 
rights treaties providing for inter-State complaints.28 This practice of not using the 
available inter-State complaints indicates that States are generally reluctant to submit 
communications alleging violations in other States even in cases of massive violations 
of ESC rights. This is possibly because of the perception that claiming violations 
in other States is an ‘unfriendly act’ in international relations and constitutes 
interference in the ‘domestic affairs’ of other States. States are also well aware that 
they generally lack a clean human rights record and as such they should not question 
another State’s human rights compliance. Accordingly, inter-State communications 
within the African regional human rights system have been rarely used.29 Thus, 
25 African Charter, supra note 1, Articles 47–55. A separate declaration is required accepting 
individual and NGo applications before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 9 June 
1998, oAu Doc. oAu/lEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PRoT (III), Articles 34(6) and 5(3); In the Matter of 
Michelot Yugogombaye vs The Republic of Senegal, Application No. 001/2008 (15 December 2009); 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 1 July 2008, available 
at: www.africa-union.org/root/au/documents/treaties/text/Protocol%20on%20the%20merged%20
Court%20-%20EN.pdf, Article 8(3).
26 African Charter, supra note 1, Article 56(1) requires communications to ‘indicate their authors’ 
without requiring that the authors have to be the victims or act on behalf of the victims.
27 Communication 155/96, infra note 63, para. 49 The Commission thanked ‘the two human rights 
NGos who brought the matter under its purview: the Social and Economic Rights Action Center 
(Nigeria) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights (uSA). Such is a demonstration of the 
usefulness to the Commission and individuals of actio popularis, which is wisely allowed under the 
African Charter’.
28 See e.g. the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, GA res. 39/46, uN Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force 26 June 1987, Article 21; 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All migrant Workers and members of 
Their Families, GA res. 45/158, uN Doc. A/45/49 (1990), entered into force 1 July 2003, Article 74; 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, GA res. 2106 
(XX), uN Doc. A/6014 (1966), entered into force 4 January 1969, Articles 11–13; and International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA res. 2200A (XXI), uN Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into 
force 23 march 1976, Articles 41–43.
29 To date the only inter-State communication before the Commission is Democratic Republic of 
Congo vs Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, Communication No. 227/99 (2003), 20th Activity Report. 
The other complaint brought by a State was filed by libya against the uS for stationing troops in 




most communications before the Commission claiming violations of ESC rights, 
and indeed all other human rights, have been submitted by NSAs – individuals 
and non-governmental organisations (NGos).30 The increasing role of NGos in 
the African human rights system can be discerned from the increasing number of 
NGos with observer Status before the African Commission.31 The most important 
communications on ESC rights are briefly reviewed below with a view to identifying 
the approach of the Commission to ESC rights and the impact of the Commission’s 
approach to the protection of ESC rights in Africa.
2.2.1. Pre-2001 Decisions
The Commission started to make public its decisions on communications brought 
before it in 1994. In jurisprudential terms, decisions of the African Commission on 
ESC rights made before 2001 did not adequately develop the normative content of 
ESC rights protected under the African Charter. This failure to develop norms also 
generally applied to the civil and political rights jurisprudence of the Commission 
pre-2001. The Commission’s decisions generally failed to delineate the freedoms 
and entitlements arising from specific rights protected in the African Charter. The 
approach of the Commission to ESC rights cases before 2001 can be observed from 
the cases summarized below which dealt with some aspects of the rights to property, 
health, education and work. The cases considered below provide a sample of the 
Commission’s approach to cases involving claims of violations of ESC rights.
2.2.1.1. Right to Property
In several communications the Commission has found a violation of the right to 
property under Article 14 without indicating the scope of this right. For example, 
in John K. Modise vs Botswana the complainant had been deported four times from 
Botswana. He claimed a violation of the right to property under Article 14 alleging to 
have suffered heavy financial loses, since the government of Botswana confiscated his 
belongings and property.32 The government of Botswana did not refute this allegation. 
In these circumstances, the Commission found ‘the above action of the government of 
Botswana an encroachment of the Complainant’s right to property guaranteed under 
Article 14 of the Charter’.33 There was no attempt to clarify the normative content of 
the right to property.
30 See Activity Reports of the African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 9.
31 See Final Communiqué of the 48th ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights Held in Banjul, The Gambia from 10 to 24 November 2010, para. 41, noting that by 
November 2010 the total number of NGos with observer Status before the African Commission 
was four hundred and eighteen (418).
32 Communication No. 97/93 (2000), 14th Activity Report.
33 Idem, para. 94.
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Indeed, only some examples of the right to property can be derived from the 
Commission’s case law. In Malawi African Association and Others vs Mauritania, land 
was considered ‘property’ for the purposes of Article 14 of the Charter.34 Although in 
later cases, the Commission stated that the ‘right to property necessarily includes a 
right to have access to property of one’s own and the right not for one’s property to be 
removed’,35 invaded or encroached upon.36 This inclusive (non-exhaustive) statement 
of the right to property was broadly framed. In any case, it failed to define what is 
meant by ‘property’. The precise scope of the right to property remained unclear. In 
particular it was uncertain whether the right to property entailed a right of everyone 
to own private property or was it limited to the protection from arbitrary deprivation 
of private property. Even in its more recent decisions on the right to property, the 
commission did not examine the normative content of the right to property.37
2.2.1.2. Rights to Health and Education
With respect to health and education, in Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers’ 
Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, Les 
Témoins de Jehovah vs Zaire it was alleged, inter alia, that the mismanagement of 
public finances, the failure of the Government to provide basic services, the shortage 
of medicines, and the closure of universities and secondary schools for two years was 
a violation of the African Charter.38 The Commission simply stated as follows:
47. Article 16 of the African Charter states that every individual shall have the right 
to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health, and that States Parties 
should take the necessary measures to protect the health of their people. The failure of the 
Government to provide basic services such as safe drinking water and electricity and the 
shortage of medicine as alleged in communication 100/93 constitutes a violation of Article 
16 (emphasis added).
34 Communications Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 à 196/97 and 210/98 (2000), 13th Activity Report, 
para. 128, stating: ‘The confiscation and looting of the property of black mauritanians and the 
expropriation or destruction of their land and houses before forcing them to go abroad constitute a 
violation of the right to property as guaranteed in article 14’.
35 Media Rights Agenda and Others vs Nigeria, Communication Nos. 105/93, 128/94, 130/94 and 
152/96 (1998), 12th Activity Report, para. 77 (emphasis added).
36 Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda vs Nigeria, 
Communication Nos. 140/94, 141/94, 145/95 (1999), 13th Activity Report, para. 55.
37 See Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights & Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe vs Republic of 
Zimbabwe, Communication No. 284/2003 (2009), 26th Activity Report, Annex 3, para. 179. The 
Commission simply stated that ‘The confiscation of the Complainants’ equipment and depriving 
them of a source of income and livelihood is also a violation of their right to property guaranteed 
under Article 14’ without articulating the normative content of the right to property. See also 
Association of Victims of Post Electoral Violence & Interights vs Cameroon, Communication No. 
272/2003, 27th Activity Report, Annex 3, paras. 33–36.
38 Communications Nos. 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93 (1996), 9th Activity Report. This decision was 
taken at the 18th ordinary Session, Praia, Cape Verde, october 1995.
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48. Article 17 of the Charter guarantees the right to education. The closures of universities 
and secondary schools as described in communication 100/93 constitutes a violation of 
Article 17.
The Commission then held, without legal reasoning, that the facts constituted ‘serious 
and massive violations’ of several provisions in the African Charter, including Article 
16 and 17. While these findings were commendable in so far as they applied the notion 
of ‘serious’ violations to ESC rights, which has been traditionally used with respect 
to civil and political rights, it can be noted that the Commission merely restated 
the relevant provisions of the African Charter, Articles 16 and 17. These Articles do 
not provide details as to the content of the rights to education and health. It would 
have been preferred to first identify the normative content of such very general 
provisions before concluding that these provisions had been violated. However, the 
Commission did not interpret these provisions. Thus apart from stating that the acts/
omissions stated above constituted violations of the rights to health and education, 
the normative content of the rights to health and education under Articles 16 and 17 
remained unclear.
later decisions made in the period 1997–2000 such as Union Inter Africaine des 
Droits de l’Homme, Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme and 
Others vs Angola;39 International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Interights on 
behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr. and Civil Liberties Organisation vs Nigeria;40 and Malawi 
African Association and Others vs Mauritania;41 did little to address the normative 
content of the relevant provisions on ESC rights in the African Charter.
For example the decision in International Pen and Others vs Nigeria found a 
violation of the right to health under Article 16 of the African Charter without 
identifying the content of the right. In this case it was alleged that mr. Ken Saro-
Wiwa, a writer, ogoni activist and president of the movement for the Survival of the 
ogoni People, was arrested in 1994 and was severely beaten during the first days of his 
detention and was held for several days in leg irons and handcuffs. He was also denied 
access to hospital treatment and the medicine he needed to control his blood pressure. 
He was held in very poor conditions. In these circumstances, the Commission found 
that:
The responsibility of the government is heightened in cases where an individual is in its 
custody and therefore someone whose integrity and well-being is completely dependent 
on the actions of the authorities. The state has a direct responsibility in this case. Despite 
requests for hospital treatment made by a qualified prison doctor, these were denied to Ken 
39 Communication No. 159/96 (1997), 11th Activity Report. Taken at the 22nd Ordinary Session, Banjul 
(Gambia), on 11 November 1997.
40 Communication Nos. 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 (1998), 12th Activity Report. Done at Banjul, 
31st October 1998.
41 Communication Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97, 196/97 and 210/98 (2000), 13th Activity Report. 
Done at Algiers, 11 May 2000.
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Saro-Wiwa, causing his health to suffer to the point where his life was endangered. The 
government has not denied this allegation in any way. This is a violation of Article 16.42
While it is clear from the foregoing that the denial of prisoners (who are vulnerable 
or marginalised section of the population) access to hospital treatment or access to 
doctors while one’s health is deteriorating is a violation of the right to health under 
Article 16 of the African Charter, the nature and scope of prisoners’ right to health 
was not clearly discerned.43
In Malawi African Association and Others vs Mauritania the African Commission 
had another opportunity to clarify the scope of prisoners’ right to health but did 
not do so. In this case, the government detained members of black ethnic groups 
in mauritania after the government was criticised by members of the black ethnic 
groups for marginalising black mauritanians. Prisoners were detained in the worst 
conditions. They only received a small amount of rice per day, without any meat or 
salt. Some of them had to eat leaves and grass. The prisoners were forced to carry out 
very hard labour day and night, and they were chained up in pairs in windowless cells. 
They only received one set of clothes and lived in very bad conditions of hygiene. They 
were regularly beaten by their guards and kept in overcrowded cells. They slept on the 
floor without any blankets, even during the cold season. The cells were infested with 
lice, bedbugs and cockroaches, and nothing was done to ensure hygiene and provision 
of health care. As a result some had died in detention. In finding a violation of Article 
16 on the basis of the facts above, the Commission stated:
The State’s responsibility in the event of detention is even more evident to the extent that 
detention centres are of its exclusive preserve, hence the physical integrity and welfare of 
detainees is the responsibility of the competent public authorities. Some prisoners died 
as a result of the lack of medical attention. The general state of health of the prisoners 
deteriorated due to the lack of sufficient food; they had neither blankets nor adequate 
hygiene. The mauritanian State is directly responsible for this state of affairs and the 
government has not denied these facts. Consequently, the Commission considers that 
there was violation of article 16.44
Thus, a violation of the right to health was established on the facts based on State 
responsibility for detention centres without defining the content of the right to health 
of prisoners. Therefore the scope of the prisoner’s right to health under the African 
42 Communication Nos. 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 (1998), 12th Activity Report, para 114. See 
also Media Rights Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project vs Nigeria, Communication Nos. 105/93, 
128/94, 130/94, 152/96, 12th Activity Report, para. 88.
43 For a discussion of prisoner’s right to health see lines, R., ‘The Right to Health of Prisoners in 
International Human Rights law’, International Journal of Prisoner Health, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2008, pp. 
3–53.




Charter remains unclear. This is despite the fact that prisoners in some African States 
still face several difficulties, impacting negatively on their right to health, including 
overcrowding, poor hygienic and sanitary conditions, lack of sleeping space, food 
and water, the absence of adequate health care, including for pregnant women and 
HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis patients, as well as the absence of specialized facilities for 
prisoners and detainees with disabilities.45
2.2.1.3. mass Expulsion of Non-nationals and ESC Rights
In Union Inter Africaine des Droits de l’Homme case it was alleged that the Angolan 
government rounded up and expelled West African nationals (Senegalese, malian, 
Gambian, mauritanian and others) on its territory between April and September 1996. 
Those affected lost their belongings. The Commission observed that: ‘mass expulsions 
of any category of persons, whether on the basis of nationality, religion, ethnic, racial 
or other considerations “constitute a special violation of human rights”’.46 It was 
further noted that:
This type of deportations [sic] calls into question a whole series of rights recognised and 
guaranteed in the Charter; such as the right to property (article 14), the right to work 
(article 15), the right to education (article 17 paragraph 1) and results in the violation by 
the State of its obligations under article 18 paragraph 1 which stipulates that “the family 
shall be the natural unit and basis of society”.47
However, the Commission did not indicate the content of the rights to property, work 
and education and how such rights were called into question. It concluded that the 
deportation of the West African nationals from Angola constituted a violation of 
articles 2 (non-discrimination), 14 (right to property) and 18 (protection of the family) 
of the African Charter without interpreting the normative content of these rights.48 
It also remained unclear why there was no finding that the other ESC rights explicitly 
protected in the Charter, in particular the rights to work and education, were also 
violated yet in another case the Commission stated that: ‘By forcibly expelling the two 
victims from Zambia, the State has violated their right to enjoyment of all the rights 
enshrined in the African Charter’.49 In short, beyond the fact that mass expulsion 
45 See e.g. Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations: Ethiopia, uN Doc. CAT/C/ETH/
Co/1 (November 2010), para. 26.
46 Communication No. 159/96 (1997), 11th Activity Report, para. 16.
47 Ibidem, para. 17.
48 In addition the Commission found violations of Article 7 (1)(a), and Article 12 (4) and (5). Article 7(1)
(a) deals with the right to an appeal to competent national organs, while Article 12(4) provides that 
‘A non-national legally admitted in a territory of a State Party to the present Charter, may only be 
expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law’. Article 12(5) prohibits 
mass expulsion of non-nationals.
49 Amnesty International vs Zambia, Communication No. 212/98 (1999), 12th Activity Report, para. 52 
(emphasis added).
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of non-nationals is discriminatory on the basis of origin, the decision is of limited 
jurisprudential value to the normative content of the relevant ESC rights under the 
African Charter.
2.2.1.4. Right to Work
In Annette Pagnoulle (on behalf of Abdoulaye Mazou) vs Cameroon,50 the complainant, 
mr. mazou was a magistrate who was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment by a military 
tribunal without trial, without witnesses, and without a right to defend himself for 
hiding his brother who was later sentenced to death for an attempted coup d’état. After 
his release he was not reinstated in his former professional capacity as a magistrate even 
after the government granted amnesty to all persons sentenced to a punishment of 
imprisonment and/or fine. The Commission found that by not reinstating mr. mazou 
in his former position after the Amnesty law, the government violated his right to 
work under Article 15 of the African Charter, because it has prevented mr. mazou to 
work in his capacity of a magistrate ‘even though others who have been condemned 
under similar conditions have been reinstated’ (para. 29). While the Commission’s 
decision could be understood to imply that Article 16 protects the right not to be 
deprived of employment unfairly or in a discriminatory manner, it is silent on the 
normative content of the right to work. Does the right to work include an absolute and 
unconditional right to obtain employment or is it limited to the right of every human 
being to decide freely to accept or choose work?
2.2.1.5. Impact of the Commission’s Pre-2001 ESC Rights Jurisprudence
The impact of the African Commission’s pre-2001 jurisprudence on ESC rights was 
to establish that ESC rights are justiciable, in the sense that individuals and groups 
who claim to be victims of violations of these rights can file complaints before an 
impartial (quasi)-judicial body and request adequate remedies or redress if a violation 
has occurred or is likely to occur. The Commission clearly demonstrated that State 
compliance with human rights obligations relating to ESC rights (e.g. property, health, 
education, work) under the African Charter are subject to (quasi)-judicial review. 
By finding specific violations of ESC rights the Commission demonstrated that the 
African Charter requires African States to comply with their obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfil ESC rights at a domestic level in the same way as they are required in 
the case of civil and political rights. In this respect, the Commission’s jurisprudence 
reinforced the principle of the interdependence of all human rights.
The impact of the African Charter and the Commission’s jurisprudence on ESC 
rights at the domestic level may be seen from the fact that some aspects of ESC 
rights were protected within African national written constitutions before 2001. For 
50 Communication No. 39/90 (1997), 10th Activity Report.
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example rights relating to property were protected in all 53 African constitutions; 46 
constitutions protected the rights related to work; 29 constitutions recognised explicitly 
the right to freedom from slavery and forced labour; 45 constitutions protected the 
right to education; 41 constitutions recognised a right to culture; 39 constitutions 
recognised the right to health in various formulations; 29 constitutions recognised the 
right to social security; 12 constitutions recognised the right to housing and shelter; 8 
constitutions protected the right to food and nutrition; and 6 constitutions recognised 
the right to (‘clean and safe’ or ‘sufficient’) water.51
While in some pre-2001 African constitutions (e.g. South Africa 1996) ESC rights 
were protected in the justiciable bill of rights, some constitutions (lesotho 1993, Nigeria 
1999, Sierra leone 1991, and Sudan 1998) recognised ESC rights only as directive 
principles of State policy perceived as non-justiciable. In some constitutions (Eritrea 
1997, Ethiopia 1995, The Gambia 1996, Ghana 1992, Guinea-Bissau 1984, liberia 1986, 
malawi 1994, Namibia 1990, Tanzania 1977, uganda 1995, and Zambia 1991) some 
ESC rights were recognised in the bill of rights while others were only recognised 
as principles of State policy. The recognition of ESC rights in national constitutions 
provides a useful starting point to hold States accountable at the domestic level.
However, it should be noted that the Commission’s pre-2001 jurisprudence shows 
that the African Commission found violations of specific ESC rights such as the 
rights to property, education, health and work but paid little attention to developing 
the normative content of the relevant rights. None of the pre-2001 decisions drew 
inspiration from international human rights law in order to interpret and develop the 
content of the African Charter’s general provisions on ESC rights. This is despite the fact 
that Article 60 of the African Charter expressly provides that ‘[t]he Commission shall 
draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ rights’, particularly 
from the provisions of various African instruments on human and peoples’ rights, the 
united Nations (uN) Charter, the Constitutive Act of the African union (formerly 
the Charter of the organisation of African unity), the universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the uN and by African countries 
in the field of human and peoples’ rights, as well as from the provisions of various 
instruments adopted within the uN specialised agencies of which the parties to the 
African Charter are members. The failure to develop the normative content of ESC 
rights meant the content of such rights remained vague. This led to the perception that 
ESC rights were mere principles and values, rather than human rights, and that most 
of these rights were not justiciable. Domestic courts did not rely on the Commission’s 
jurisprudence.
51 See Heyns, C. and Kaguongo, W., ‘Constitutional Human Rights law in Africa’, South African 
Journal on Human Rights, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2006, pp. 673–717.
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2.2.1.6. Why Did the Commission Refrain from Developing the Normative Content 
 of ESC Rights in its Pre-2001 Decisions?
Several reasons can be advanced to explain the Commission’s approach to ESC rights 
before 2001. First, when the Commission commenced its work it had several limitations 
impacting on the quality of its decisions including those on ESC rights. Such limitations 
included the lack of expertise on the part of the Commission in dealing with cases 
involving violations of ESC rights, the lack of legal officers with expertise on ESC 
rights and the Commission’s initial reluctance to pay greater attention to ESC rights.52 
Even before the Commission was inaugurated, Prof. umozurike, who later became 
the Commission’s Chairperson, stated that ‘it seems likely that the Commission will 
be more concerned with civil and political rights’ noting that ‘should it venture into 
economic and social ones, it would find too many problems in too many countries 
to cope with’.53 Thus, developing jurisprudence on ESC rights and their enforcement 
was not a priority. This occurred within a broader context in which ESC rights tended 
to be marginalized as human rights in international human rights law and practice.
Second, the Commission also generally avoided dealing in-depth with the 
few cases before it (whether on issues relating to civil and political rights or ESC 
rights) because of the dominant perception, at the time, that: ‘the main goal of the 
Commission’s procedure is to initiate a positive dialogue, resulting into an amicable 
resolutions between the complainant and the state concerned’.54 If the Commission’s 
main goal was to initiate a ‘positive dialogue’, developing the normative content of 
rights through detailed (quasi)-judicial decisions was not considered as necessary to 
achieve the Commission’s perceived main goal.
Third, civil society actors including individuals and NGos did not bring several 
communications before the Commission alleging ESC rights violations. Even in the 
few cases brought before the Commission, submissions were not comprehensive. For 
example there were no communications alleging violations of the rights to adequate 
food, adequate housing, and social security.
Finally, the African Commission did not feel at ease in developing rights where 
there was little concrete international jurisprudence.55 In fact, the uN system, 
52 See umozurike, u.o., ‘The Protection of Human Rights under the Banjul (African) Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights’, African Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No. 1 1988, pp. 65–83, at 
p. 81; umozurike, u.o., ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Suggestions for more 
Effectiveness’, Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 13, 2007, pp. 179–190, at 
p. 185.
53 umozurike, u.o., ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 77, No. 4, 1983, pp. 902–912, at p. 911.
54 See Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des 
Droits de l’Homme, Les Témoins de Jehovah vs Zaire [DRC], Communications Nos. 25/89, 47/90, 
56/91,100/93(1996), 9th Activity Report, para 39.




particularly the uN Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), in 
the 1990s was just developing the normative content of ESC rights and the nature of 
State obligations.56 Expert guidelines on violations of ESC rights were only made in 
1997.57 These had not been applied in specific cases at either national or international 
levels.
2.2.2. Decisions from 2001
It is important to note that most decisions of the Commission on ESC rights decided 
on the merits from 2001 have relied increasingly on international human rights law 
to develop the normative content of some ESC rights under the African Charter. The 
decisions became longer with more elaborate reasoning. Some illustrative examples 
are considered below.
2.2.2.1. The Right to Property
After 2001, the Commission has interpreted the scope of the right to property in 
the African Charter by stating that it encompasses two main principles.58 The first 
principle, which is of a general nature, provides for the principle of ownership and 
peaceful enjoyment of property.59 The role of the State is to respect and protect this 
right against any form of encroachment, and to regulate the exercise of this right in 
order for it to be accessible to everyone, taking public interest into due consideration.60 
The second principle provides for the possibility, and conditions of deprivation 
of the right to property.61 Article 14 of the Charter recognises that States are in 
certain circumstances entitled, among other things, to control the use of property in 
accordance with the ‘public or general interest’, by enforcing such laws as they deem 
necessary for the purpose.62 The confiscation of private property without a showing 
of a public or general interest of the community would be arbitrary and in violation 
of Article 14.
56 The CESCR clarified the scope of several substantive rights such as the right to adequate housing, 
the right to adequate food and the right to education in the 1990s. See CESCR, General Comments 
4, 7, 12 and 13.
57 See maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, maastricht, 22–
26 January 1997, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 20 No. 3, 1998, pp. 691–704.
58 See Interights, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, and Association Mauritanienne 
des Droits de l’Homme vs Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Communication 373/2009 (formerly 
242/2001), (2010), 28th Activity Report, para. 44.
59 Idem.
60 Ibidem, para. 43.
61 Ibidem, para. 44.
62 Idem.
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2.2.2.2. The Right to Health and the Right to a Clean Environment
In The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and 
Social Rights vs Nigeria63 (SERAC case) the complainants alleged that the Nigerian 
government violated the right to health and the right to a clean environment as 
recognized under Articles 16 and 24 of the African Charter by failing to fulfil the 
minimum duties required by these rights.64 This, the Complainants alleged, the 
government did by: (i) directly participating in the contamination of air, water and 
soil and thereby harming the health of the ogoni population; (ii) failing to protect 
the ogoni population from the harm caused by the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Company (NNPC) in a consortium with Shell Petroleum Development Corporation 
(SPDC) but instead using its security forces to facilitate the damage; and (iii) failing to 
provide or permit studies of potential or actual environmental and health risks caused 
by the oil operations. unlike in the previous cases, the Commission commented on 
the normative content of the right to a healthy environment under Articles 16 and 24 
by stating as follows:
52. The right to a general satisfactory environment, as guaranteed under Article 24 of the 
African Charter or the right to a healthy environment, as it is widely known, therefore 
imposes clear obligations upon a government. It requires the State to take reasonable and 
other measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, 
and to secure an ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources. Article 
12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), to 
which Nigeria is a party, requires governments to take necessary steps for the improvement 
of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene. The right to enjoy the best attainable 
state of physical and mental health enunciated in Article 16(1) of the African Charter and 
the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to development (Article 16(3)) 
already noted obligate governments to desist from directly threatening the health and 
environment of their citizens. The State is under an obligation to respect the just noted 
rights and this entails largely non-interventionist conduct from the State for example, not 
from carrying out, sponsoring or tolerating any practice, policy or legal measures violating 
the integrity of the individual.
53. Government compliance with the spirit of Articles 16 and 24 of the African Charter 
must also include ordering or at least permitting independent scientific monitoring of 
threatened environments, requiring and publicising environmental and social impact 
studies prior to any major industrial development, undertaking appropriate monitoring 
63 Communication 155/96, (2001), 15th Activity Report, Annex V. Done at the 30th ordinary Session, 
held in Banjul, The Gambia from 13–27 october 2001. For a comment on this case see Shelton, D., 
‘Decision Regarding Communication 155/96: Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the 
Center for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, 
No. 4, 2002, pp. 937–941.
64 Article 24 of the African Charter reads: ‘All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development’.
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and providing information to those communities exposed to hazardous materials and 
activities and providing meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard and to 
participate in the development decisions affecting their communities.
Applying the above standards to the facts of the case, the Commission concluded that 
although Nigeria had the right to produce oil, it had not protected the rights of the 
ogoni under Article 16 and 24. Thus, the Commission read the rights to health and to 
a clean environment together.
In a decision adopted in 2009, the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions vs The 
Sudan,65 (CoHRE case) the Commission further elaborated on the scope of the right 
to health under Article 16 by relying on the interpretation of the right to health in 
international law. In this communication, the complainants alleged gross, massive 
and systematic violations of human rights by the Republic of Sudan (involving 
destruction of homes, livestock and farms as well as the poisoning of water sources) 
against the indigenous Black African tribes in the Darfur region of Western Sudan, 
in particular, members of the Fur, marsalit and Zaghawa tribes. It was claimed that 
the Republic of Sudan was complicit in looting and destroying foodstuffs, crops and 
livestock as well as poisoning wells and denying access to water sources in the Darfur 
region in violation of Article 16. The Commission gave the right to health meaningful 
content by relying on the normative definition of the right to health as spelt out by the 
uN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in General Comment No. 
14 on the ‘The right to the highest attainable standard of health’.66 The Commission 
stated that:
209. In its General Comment No. 14 on the right to health adopted in 2000, the uN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights sets out that, ‘the right to health 
extends not only to timely and appropriate health care but also to the underlying 
determinants of health, such as, access to safe and portable water, an adequate supply of 
safe food, nutrition, and housing […]’. In terms of the General Comment, the right to 
health contains four elements: availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality, and 
impose three types of obligations on States – to respect, fulfil and protect the right. In 
terms of the duty to protect, the State must ensure that third parties (non-state actors) do 
not infringe upon the enjoyment of the right to health.
210. Violations of the right to health can occur through the direct action of States or other 
entities insufficiently regulated by States. According to General Comment 14, ‘states should 
also refrain from unlawfully polluting air, water and soil, […] during armed conflicts in 
violation of international humanitarian law […]. States should also ensure that third parties 
65 Communication Nos. 279/03 & 296/05 (2009), 28th Activity Report. Adopted during the 45th 
ordinary Session, held between 13–27 may 2009, Banjul, The Gambia. The decision was not made 
public until July 2010.
66 uN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, (11 August 2000).
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do not limit people’s access to health-related information and services, and the failure to 
enact or enforce laws to prevent the pollution of water […] [violates the right to health]’.
Applying this understanding of the right to health – as extending to healthcare and 
the underlying determinants of health – to the facts, the Commission found that ‘the 
destruction of homes, livestock and farms as well as the poisoning of water sources, 
such as wells exposed the victims to serious health risks and amounts to a violation 
of Article 16 of the Charter’.67 It is likely that in appropriate communications in the 
future the Commission will continue to rely on the General Comments of the uN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to interpret ESC rights under the 
Charter as it did in the Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority 
Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council vs Kenya,68 SERAC 
and COHRE cases.
2.2.2.3. Examples of Implied Rights: Housing, Food, Social Security, Water and  
 Sanitation
In the SERAC Case the Commission further innovatively interpreted the Charter 
through implying other rights not expressly protected in the Charter. This was done 
by reading into the Charter the rights to adequate housing and food. The Commission 
stated that although the right to housing or shelter is not explicitly provided for under 
the African Charter, the corollary of the combination of the provisions protecting the 
right to enjoy the best attainable state of mental and physical health (Article 16), the 
right to property (Article 14), and the protection accorded to the family (Article 18(1)) 
forbids the wanton destruction of shelter because when housing is destroyed, property, 
health, and family life are adversely affected.69 It concluded that the ‘combined effect 
of Articles 14, 16 and 18(1) reads into the Charter a right to shelter or housing’.70 
This entails the obligation to refrain from, and protect against, forced evictions from 
home(s) and land; and ensuring access to adequate housing which includes access to 
safe drinking water, energy for cooking, heating, cooling and lighting, sanitation and 
washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency 
services.71
With respect to the right to food, it was argued that it is implicit in the African 
Charter, in such provisions as the right to life (Article 4), the right to health 
(Article 16) and the right to economic, social and cultural development (Article 22). 
67 Communication Nos. 279/03 & 296/05, supra note 65, para. 212.
68 Communication No. 276/2003, (2009), 27th Activity Report, para. 200 citing with approval General 
Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing, uN Doc. E/1992/23, annex III at 114 (1991), para. 
18; and General Comment No. 7: Forced Evictions and the Right to Adequate Housing, u.N. Doc. 
E/1998/22, annex IV at 113 (1998), para. 14.
69 Communication 155/96, supra note 63, para. 60.
70 Ibidem.
71 Draft Principles and Guidelines, supra. note 24, para. 64.
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The Commission accepted that the right to food is inseparably linked to the dignity 
of human beings and is therefore essential for the enjoyment and fulfilment of such 
other rights as health, education, work and political participation.72 It then stated that 
the ‘African Charter and international law require and bind Nigeria to protect and 
improve existing food sources and to ensure access to adequate food for all citizens’.73 
The right to food entails a State obligation to ensure that individuals including 
members of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in a State’s jurisdiction are free 
from hunger and are ensured food security and sufficient, accessible and quality food 
culturally acceptable.74 By its violation of the rights protected in Articles 4, 14, 16, and 
18(1) of the African Charter, the Commission found that the Nigerian government 
trampled upon not only the rights explicitly protected but also upon the rights to 
adequate housing and food implicitly guaranteed.
other ESC rights implied in the African Charter include the rights to social 
security, water and sanitation.75 The right to social security is derived from a joint 
reading of Articles 4, 5, 6, 15, 16, and 18 of the African Charter that protect the 
rights to life, dignity, liberty, work, health, protection of the family, the aged and 
persons with disabilities. The right to water and sanitation is derived from the joint 
reading of Articles 4, 5, 15, 16, 22, and 24 protecting the rights to life, dignity, work, 
health, economic, social and cultural development and the right to a satisfactory 
environment.
It should be noted that the Commission might be criticised for creating additional 
rights in the Charter which States never consented to (and thus compromise legal 
certainty or rule of law). However, it is in line with the Commission’s Reporting 
Guidelines which require States to report on rights not explicitly protected in the 
Charter (e.g. the right to an adequate standard of living;76 the right to social security;77 
and rights to rest, leisure, limitation of working hours, and holiday with pay, and 
trade union rights78). moreover, these rights are protected in other international 
human rights treaties such as the ICESCR to which the vast majority of African States 
are parties without reservations. The rights to adequate food and housing are also 
protected in other African human rights instruments.79 This approach of implying 
rights in the African Charter found support in the Statement on Social, Economic and 
Cultural Rights in Africa, adopted on 17 September 2004, in Pretoria, South Africa.80 
72 Ibidem, para. 65.
73 Idem.
74 Draft Principles and Guidelines, supra. note 24, para. 70.
75 Ibidem, paras. 65–67, 71–75.
76 Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, supra note 24, paras II.A.31–34.
77 Ibidem, para. II.18.
78 Ibidem, paras. 9, 10, and 17.
79 See e.g. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa, supra note 6, Articles 15 and 16.
80 For the text see African Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2005, pp. 182–193. See also Khoza, 
S., ‘Promoting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa: The African Commission Hold a 
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This Statement which has since been adopted by the Commission,81 asserts that the 
ESC rights ‘explicitly provided for under the African Charter, read together with 
other rights in the Charter, such as the right to life and respect for inherent human 
dignity, imply the recognition of other economic and social rights, including the right 
to shelter, the right to basic nutrition and the right to social security’.82 The effect of 
this interpretation is to read into the African Charter all ESC rights not stated in the 
Charter. In the COHRE case the Commission reaffirmed that Article 16 of the African 
Charter protects implicitly the rights to adequate food and housing, including the 
prohibition on forced evictions, and also guarantees the right to water. All these are 
underlying determinants of health. No State has challenged ‘implied’ rights in the 
Charter suggesting that the Commission’s approach reflects a contemporary reading 
of the African Charter which is consistent with international human rights law.
2.2.2.4. The Right to Education
The Commission decisions to-date have not addressed to scope of the right to 
education under Article 17(1) of the African Charter. For example in Kevin Mgwanga 
Gumne et al vs Cameroon the complainants alleged that Cameroon violated Article 
17 of the Charter, because it was destroying education in the Southern Cameroons 
by underfunding and understaffing primary education.83 It was also alleged that 
Cameroon imposed inappropriate reform of secondary and technical education. 
It was further alleged that the State discriminates Southern Cameroonians in the 
admission into the Polytechnique in Yaoundé, and refused to grant authorisation for 
registration of the Bamenda university of Science and Technology, thereby violating 
Article 17 on the right to education. The African Commission found that there was 
no violation of the right to education under Article 17(1) of the African Charter, 
without elaborating on the content of this right, because the ‘Complainants did not 
substantiate the allegations’.84 This was a missed opportunity to clarify the scope of 
the right to education under the African Charter.
However, the scope of the right to education under Article 17 of the African 
Charter was clarified by the African Commission in its Draft Principles and 
Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter.85 The 
Commission indicated that the right to education includes the right of all children 
to free and compulsory primary education; to make secondary (including technical 
Seminar in Pretoria’, African Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2004, pp. 334–343.
81 Resolution on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights in Africa, ACHPR /Res.73(XXXVI)04 
(2004).
82 Statement on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights in Africa, supra note 80, para. 10. See also Draft 
Principles and Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 24, paras. 64–75 
(implying rights to housing, social security, food, water and sanitation in the African Charter).
83 Communication 266/2003, (2009), 26th Activity Report, Annex IV, para. 145.
84 Ibidem, para. 149.
85 Draft Principles and Guidelines, supra. note 24, para. 57.
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and vocational) education available and accessible to all; to make higher and tertiary 
education equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity; to ensure accessible and 
affordable adult education; the prohibition on the use of corporal punishment; to 
ensure that all educational programmes are of a high quality and appropriate to the 
needs of society; and to ensure academic freedom in all schools and institutions of 
higher learning.86
2.2.2.5. The Right to Cultural life
With respect to the right to the right to cultural life under Article 17(2), the African 
Commission has understood culture to include ‘cultural diversity’ by stating that:
[…] Article 17 of the Charter is of a dual dimension in both its individual and collective 
nature, protecting, on the one hand, individuals’ participation in the cultural life of their 
community and, on the other hand, obliging the state to promote and protect traditional 
values recognised by a community. It thus understands culture to mean that complex 
whole which includes a spiritual and physical association with one’s ancestral land, 
knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired 
by humankind as a member of society – the sum total of the material and spiritual activities 
and products of a given social group that distinguish it from other similar groups. It has 
also understood cultural identity to encompass a group’s religion, language, and other 
defining characteristics.87
If Article 17(2) of the African Charter is interpreted in light of Article 15 of the 
ICESCR, ‘cultural life’ should be interpreted as encompassing, inter alia, ways of life, 
language, oral and written literature, music and song, non-verbal communication, 
religion or belief systems, rites and ceremonies, sport and games, methods of 
production or technology, natural and man-made environments, food, clothing and 
shelter and the arts, customs and traditions through which individuals, groups of 
individuals and communities express their humanity and the meaning they give 
to their existence, and build their world view representing their encounter with the 
external forces affecting their lives.88 Although the right to take part in cultural life of 
the community includes ‘the inalienable right [of any people] to organise its cultural 
life in full harmony with its political, economic, social, philosophical and spiritual 
ideas’,89 cultural practices must be consistent with international norms on human 
and peoples’ rights.90 Thus, participation in cultural life under Article 17(2) of the 
86 Ibidem.
87 Communication No. 276/2003, supra. note 70, para. 241.
88 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 21: Right of Everyone 
to Take Part in Cultural Life, uN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (21 December 2009), para 13.
89 See Cultural Charter for Africa, adopted 15 July 1976, entered into force 19 September 1990, 
preamble.
90 See African Charter, supra. note 1, Articles 60 and 61.
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African Charter cannot be invoked to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by 
international law, or to limit their scope. By implication States are obliged to eradicate 
all forms of harmful cultural practices such as female genital mutilation which violate 
human rights.91
Thus, States have the duty to tolerate cultural diversity or multiculturalism and to 
introduce measures that protect identity groups different from those of the majority/
dominant group in accordance with international human rights law. The Commission 
has thus interpreted Article 17(2) as requiring governments to take measures ‘aimed at 
the conservation, development and diffusion of culture’, such as promoting ‘cultural 
identity as a factor of mutual appreciation among individuals, groups, nations and 
regions; […] promoting awareness and enjoyment of cultural heritage of national 
ethnic groups and minorities and of indigenous sectors of the population’.92
2.2.2.6. Impact of the Commission’s Post-2001 ESC Rights Jurisprudence
The Commission’s jurisprudence on most ESC rights from 2001 has generally been 
helpful in developing the normative content of these rights and in clarifying the 
nature of State obligations, remedies for violations of ESC rights and limitations to 
and derogations from ESC rights under the African Charter (as shown in sections 3 
and 4 below). As the examples considered above demonstrate, the Commission has 
been able to develop the normative content of some ESC rights in its decisions on 
merits concerning some ESC rights e.g. the right to property, health and participation 
in cultural life. In addition, as noted above, the Commission’s jurisprudence has led 
to reading ‘new’ ESC rights into the Charter in particular the rights to adequate food 
and housing, rights that were not explicitly included in the text of the African Charter. 
As a result of these developments the Commission has been able to develop principles 
and guidelines on ESC rights consolidating the normative standards on ESC rights.
The jurisprudence of the African Commission on ESC rights has also had an impact 
at the sub-regional level in Africa as reflected in the decisions of African sub-regional 
institutions giving prominence to the justiciability of ESC rights. For example, in 
the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) vs Federal Republic of 
Nigeria and Universal Basic Education Commission,93 the plaintiff claimed before the 
Economic Community of West African States Community Court of Justice (ECoWAS 
Court) a violation of the right to education under Article 17 of the African Charter 
due to alleged lack of adequate implementation of Nigeria’s Compulsory and Basic 
Education Act 2004 and the Child’s Rights Act, 2004. The ECoWAS Court considered 
whether it had the jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim involving an alleged violation 
of the right to education under Article 17 of the African Charter. Relying on Article 
91 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 
supra note 6, Article 5.
92 Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, supra note 24.
93 Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/0808 (27 october 2009).
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9(4) of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty establishing the ECoWAS Court94 
and Article 4(g) of the Revised Treaty of ECoWAS,95 the Court held that ‘it is well 
established that the rights guaranteed by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights are justiciable before this Court’.96 The Court dismissed the government’s 
contention that education is ‘a mere directive policy of the government and not a legal 
entitlement of the citizens’, concluding that the contention of the government that ‘the 
right to education is not justiciable as it falls within the directive principles of state 
policy cannot hold’.97 The decision is in line with the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission which establishes that all rights under the African Charter including 
ESC rights are justiciable.
The ECoWAS Court has also relied on the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission to allow public interest litigation which enables NGos to file complaints 
against human rights violations, including ESC rights violations, before the ECoWAS 
Court. This has been done without the need for any specific mandate from the people 
affected. For example, in The Registered Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights & 
Accountability Project (SERAP) vs President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & Ors,98 
the ECoWAS Court relied on the decision of the African Commission in SERAC vs 
Nigeria99 and stated:
Taking into account the need to reinforce the access to justice for the protection of human 
and people rights in the African context, the Court holds that an NGo duly constituted 
according to national law of any ECoWAS member State, and enjoying observer status 
before ECoWAS institutions, can file complaints against human rights violation in case 
that the victim is not just a single individual, but a large group of individuals or even entire 
communities.100
At a domestic level, several African States increasingly protect ESC rights either in 
ordinary legislation or in national constitutions.101 For example, Nigeria has given 
effect to the domestication of the African Charter by virtue of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act,102 which empowers 
the Nigerian courts to enforce or give remedies under the provision of the African 
94 Article 9(4) of the Supplementary Protocol grants the Court jurisdiction to determine cases of 
violations of human rights in member States of ECoWAS.
95 Revised Treaty of ECoWAS, available at: www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=treaty&lang=en. 
Article 4(g) of the Revised Treaty of ECoWAS affirms and declares the adherence of ECoWAS 
member States to the ‘recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in 
accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’.
96 Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/0808, supra note 93, para. 20.
97 Ibidem.
98 Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/09 (20 December 2010).
99 Communication 155/96, supra. note 63, para. 49.
100 Idem, para. 61.
101 Viljoen, op.cit. note 2, 568–585.
102 Chapter 10, laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990.
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Charter. In States which protect ESC rights in national constitutions ESC rights are 
protected either as directive principles of State policy and/or as part of the Bill of 
Rights. Recent constitutions in Africa protect justiciable ESC rights demonstrating 
the trend towards more recognition of the priority to be accorded to these rights. 
For example, the Constitution of the Republic of Angola 2010 protects several ESC 
rights in the justiciable Bill of Rights including the rights to work (Article 76), health 
and social protection (Article 77), education and culture (Article 79), and the right to 
housing (Article 85).
In a similar manner the Constitution of Kenya 2010 protects a wide range of ESC 
rights in Article 43 as follows:
(1) Every person has the right –
(a) to the highest attainable standard of health, which includes the right to health care 
services, including reproductive health care;
(b) to accessible and adequate housing, and to reasonable standards of sanitation;
(c) to be free from hunger, and to have adequate food of acceptable quality;
(d) to clean and safe water in adequate quantities;
(e) to social security; and
(f) to education.
(2) A person shall not be denied emergency medical treatment.
(3) The State shall provide appropriate social security to persons who are unable to support 
themselves and their dependants.
likewise the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011 protects 
in the Bill of Rights the right to property (Article 28), education (Article 29), healthcare 
(Article 31) and housing (Article 34). Article 9(2) states that: ‘The rights and freedoms 
of individuals and groups enshrined in this Bill shall be respected, upheld and 
promoted by all organs and agencies of Government and by all persons’.
The South African Constitution is also very well known for its protection of ESC 
rights as justiciable rights.103 It requires the State to take ‘reasonable’ legislative and 
other measures to achieve the ‘progressive realisation’ of several ESC rights ‘within 
available resources’. This standard of ‘reasonable’ measures has been elaborated upon 
by the South African Constitutional Court in key ESC rights cases.104 At least in part, 
all the above developments are an attempt to give effect to at a domestic level to the 
103 See Constitution of South Africa 1996, Sections 24–29 protecting healthy environment, land and 
natural resources, housing, healthcare, food, water, social security, and education.
104 See e.g. Soobramoney vs Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) (CCT32/97); 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC)
(27 November 1997); Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others vs Grootboom and 
Others (CCT11/00) 2001 (1) SA 46 (4 october 2000); Minister of Health and Others vs Treatment 
Action Campaign and Others (No 1) (CCT9/02) 2002 (5) SA 703(5 July 2002); Khosa and Others vs 
Minister of Social Development and Others, Mahlaule and Another vs Minister of Social Development 
(CCT 13/03, CCT 12/03) 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (4 march 2004); Mazibuko and Others vs City of 
Johannesburg and Others (CCT 39/09) 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) (8 october 2009).
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protection of ESC rights under the African Charter, as elaborated by the African 
Commission.
2.2.2.7. Why Has the Commission Developed its Approach to the Normative  
 Content of ESC Rights in its Decisions from 2001?
There are several reasons for the change in the Commission’s approach to ESC 
rights communications. First, the approach of the Commission has been influenced 
by developments in the international discourse on ESC rights including the trend 
towards increasing justiciability of ESC rights. Since 1999 the CESCR has, through 
several General Comments, developed the normative content of ESC rights and the 
corresponding State obligations, including the right to adequate food, education, 
health, water, work and social security. Some of these rights have also been the subject 
of adjudication before domestic jurisdictions. Thus, the Commission has benefitted 
from these developments in the clarification of normative international standards 
as reflected in its increased use of international human rights law to interpret the 
general provisions of the African Charter. The approach of the Commission is in 
line with the developments towards increased justiciability of ESC rights at both 
the international and domestic levels. To be sure, the emerging consensus that the 
idea that ESC rights, as a whole category, are not fit for (quasi)judicial adjudication is 
‘seriously misguided’.105
Second, a more detailed approach to ESC rights may be attributed to several other 
factors with a direct impact on the Commission’s work including ‘Commissioners 
who were prepared to articulate reasons more clearly, by better secretarial support,106 
and through improved contribution of pleadings by the parties’ as well as the greater 
and increasingly critical engagement of States.107 Furthermore, NGos with a focus on 
ESC rights have been essential in bringing ESC rights cases before the Commission 
and further improving the quality of legal arguments before the Commission in favour 
of ESC rights. Such NGos include the Social and Economic Rights Action Center 
(SERAC);108 the Center for Economic and Social Rights and the Socio-Economic 
Rights and Accountability Project.109
105 See e.g. International Commission of Jurists, Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Geneva, International Commission of Jurists, 2008, 103. See also Ssenyonjo, 
m., ‘Reflections on State obligations with Respect to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
International Human Rights law’, The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 15, No.6, 2011, 
pp. 969–1012.
106 At the time of writing a small full-time secretariat but inadequately resourced, based in Banjul, 
the Gambia, and headed by a Secretary, provides continuity and administrative support to 
the Commission. It does the necessary legal research and prepares draft decisions for the 
commissioners.
107 Viljoen, op.cit. note 2, 354.
108 See e.g. Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) vs Nigeria, Communication 370/09.
109 See e.g. Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project vs Libya, Communication 378/09; 
Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) vs the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
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Finally, the adoption of the Au Constitutive Act on 11 July 2000, which replaced 
the 1963 Charter of the organisation of African unity (oAu Charter),110 placed 
more emphasis on the promotion and protection of human rights in accordance with 
the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments.111 This includes 
the promotion and protection of ESC rights. The Commission has therefore given 
more focus to ESC rights since its 36th ordinary Session held from 23 November to 
7 December 2004 in Dakar, Senegal, when the Commission adopted Resolution 73 
specifically on ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa’.112 one of the decisions 
coming from Resolution 73 was the establishment of a Working Group composed 
of members of the African Commission and NGos with a mandate to develop and 
propose to the African Commission ‘draft principles and guidelines on economic, 
social and cultural rights’. The Working Group developed two documents: (1) a 
compilation of Principles and Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and (2) a compilation of Reporting Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in Africa adopted by the Commission with amendments in November 2010.113 
These Guidelines consolidate the jurisprudence of the African Commission on ESC 
rights and would guide States in complying with their reporting obligations on ESC 
rights under the African Charter.
3. STATE AND NoN-STATE ACToR oBlIGATIoNS uNDER 
THE AFRICAN CHARTER
The purpose of this section is two-fold. It reviews the African Commission’s emerging 
jurisprudence on State obligations with respect to ESC rights. It also considers the 
Commission’s approach to the question of whether NSAs (non-parties to the African 
Charter) have any human rights obligations under the African Charter, and in 
particular to respect ESC rights.
3.1. ClARIFYING STATE oBlIGATIoNS
There are four aspects of State obligations considered below. First consideration is 
made of the tripartite typology of State obligations under ‘respect, protect and fulfil’ 
Communication 338/07. The Case was declared admissible by the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECoWAS) Court of Justice in Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project 
(SERAP) vs Federal Republic of Nigeria and Universal Basic Education Commission, No. ECW/CCJ/
APP/0808.
110 479 uNTS 39, entered into force 13 September 1963.
111 See the Constitutive Act of the African union, CAD/lEG/23.15, entered into force 26 may 2001, 
preamble, Article 3(e) and (h), Article 4 (g)-(p).
112 ACHPR/Res.73(XXXVI)04, (2004).
113 See Report of the 48th ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(10–24 November 2010, Banjul, The Gambia), para. 244.
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as applied by the African Commission. Second, the notion of ‘progressive realisation’ 
of ESC rights subject to available resources is considered in the context of the African 
Charter. Third, the obligation to eliminate discrimination is outlined. Finally, the 
extraterritorial application of the African Charter is considered.
3.1.1. Respect, Protect and Fulfil
The general obligation of State Parties to the African Charter as stated in Article 1 of 
the Charter is to ‘recognise the rights, duties and freedoms’ enshrined in the Charter 
and to ‘undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them’. This 
is not explicitly subjected to progressive realisation. Thus, State Parties are obliged to 
‘recognise’ immediately ESC rights by adopting legislative or other (non-legislative) 
measures to produce the result of preventing all violations of the African Charter. This 
obligation was clarified by the African Commission in The Social and Economic Rights 
Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights vs Nigeria.114 In this case, 
which dealt with gross human rights violations (by Shell, acting in collaboration with 
the government of Nigeria) in the oil-rich ogoniland region of Nigeria, the African 
Commission stated that all rights – both civil and political rights and social and 
economic – generate at least four levels of duties for a State that undertakes to adhere 
to a rights regime, namely the duty to ‘respect, protect, promote, and fulfil’ these 
rights.115 This typology of State obligations has been explained by the Commission 
as follows:
At a primary level, the obligation to respect entails that the State should refrain from 
interfering in the enjoyment of all fundamental rights; it should respect right-holders, their 
freedoms, autonomy, resources, and liberty of their action. At a secondary level, the State is 
required to ensure others also respect their rights. This is what is called the State’s obligation 
to protect right-holders against other subjects by legislation and provision of effective 
remedies. This obligation requires the State to take measures to protect beneficiaries of the 
protected rights against political, economic and social interferences. Protection generally 
entails the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere or framework of an effective 
interplay of laws and regulations so that individuals will be able to freely realize their rights 
and freedoms. This is very much intertwined with the tertiary obligation of the State to 
promote the enjoyment of all human rights. The State should make sure that individuals 
are able to exercise their rights and freedoms, for example, by promoting tolerance, raising 
awareness, and even building infrastructures. The last layer of obligation requires the 
114 Communication 155/96, supra note 63.
115 Ibidem, paras. 44–47. However, this analysis is not always applied consistently by the Commission. 
For example, in the COHRE case, supra note 65, para. 191, the Commission stated the ‘State has an 
obligation under Article 14 of the African Charter not only to respect the “right to property”, but 
also to protect that right’. No reference was made to the State obligation to promote and to fulfil the 
right to property. The obligation to promote was only made with reference to ‘cultural rights’ in 
para. 248.
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State to fulfil the rights and freedoms it freely undertook under the various human rights 
regimes. It is more of a positive expectation on the part of the State to move its machinery 
towards the actual realisation of the rights.116
The Commission found that the killing and destruction by government forces and 
agents of the State-controlled oil company violated Nigeria’s duty to ‘respect’ the right 
to life and dignity, the right to health, property, and the ‘implied’ rights to shelter 
and food, as well as the right to economic, social, and cultural development of the 
ogonis. Thus, all substantive ESC rights (explicitly and implicitly) protected under 
the Charter entail the above duties on the State subject to available resources.
3.1.2. Progressive Realisation
Although the African Charter does not explicitly subject State obligations under the 
Charter to the notion of ‘progressive realisation’ subject to ‘available resources’, the 
Commission read this into Article 16 of the Charter in Purohit and Moore vs The 
Gambia (Purohit case).117 In this communication, while interpreting State obligations 
with respect to the right to health under Article 16 of the African Charter, the 
African Commission recognised that ‘African countries are generally faced with the 
problem of poverty which renders them incapable to provide the necessary amenities, 
infrastructure and resources that facilitate the full enjoyment of this right’.118 
Accordingly, the Commission held that State Parties to the African Charter have to take 
‘concrete and targeted steps’, while taking full advantage of their available resources, 
to ‘ensure’ that the right to health is fully realised in all aspects without discrimination 
of any kind.119 This confirms the view of the uN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights expressed in several General Comments.120 Since the African 
Charter does not explicitly make the ‘fulfilment’ of its rights dependent on ‘available 
resources’, it may be questioned whether the reference to available resources in the 
Purohit case was influenced by the specific wording of Article 16 (which provides for 
the ‘best attainable’ state of health and ‘necessary measures’) or whether it applies 
generally to all other rights. While this is not clear from the Commission’s decision, it 
has been argued that the reference to available resources was not a general statement 
about the duty to ‘fulfil’ rights and should therefore not, on the basis of this decision, 
be applied to the ‘unqualified’ right to education.121
116 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum vs Zimbabwe, Communication 245/2002, Annex III, (2006), 
21st Activity Report at 54, para. 152.
117 Communication No. 241/2001, (2003), 16th Activity Report, Annex VII.
118 Ibidem, para. 84.
119 Idem.
120 See CESCR, General Comments, available at: www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/comments.
htm.
121 Viljoen, supra note 2, 240. Article 17(1) of the African Charter simply states: ‘Every individual shall 
have the right to education’.
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However, in practice it remains a fact that the problem of poverty renders African 
countries incapable of not only providing the necessary amenities, infrastructure 
and resources that facilitate the full enjoyment of the right to health, but also 
other rights including ESC rights (such as education, adequate housing, and social 
security) as well as civil and political rights (such as the provision of adequate legal 
aid, establishing sufficient courts, re-education of police, training of lawyers and 
judges essential for a fair trial). Thus, the progressive realisation of all human rights 
subject to available resources is inevitable for many African States. In this respect 
Article 13(3)(a) and (b) of the African Children’s Charter while obliging States to 
‘provide free and compulsory basic education’, requires States to merely ‘encourage 
the development of secondary education in its different forms and to progressively 
make it free and accessible to all’ (emphasis added). The Commission’s guidelines on 
State reports have also taken a realistic approach indicating that ESC rights have to 
be realised ‘progressively’. For example, States are required to report about measures 
‘for the progressive implementation of the principle of compulsory education free of 
charge’122 and on how social security benefits are extended to ‘further groups of the 
population’.123
Progressive realisation is necessarily linked to the available resources for 
State parties to the African Charter, which ‘are developing countries with scarce 
resources’.124 Thus, a State Party to the African Charter is only under ‘obligation to 
invest its resources in the best way possible to attain the progressive realisation of […] 
economic, social and cultural rights’.125 It follows that a State is not required to do 
more than what its available resources permit. of course, a State would be required to 
develop existing resources and to use available resources in the ‘best way possible’ (i.e. 
to the maximum) to enhance the realisation of ESC rights.126
3.1.3. Elimination of Discrimination
State Parties to the African Charter have a general obligation to eliminate discrimination, 
formally (in law) and substantively (in practice) since non-discrimination is a 
‘fundamental principle’ in international human rights law essential to the exercise 
and enjoyment of all human rights including ESC rights.127 In this regard, Article 2 of 
the African Charter emphatically stipulates that:
122 Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, supra note 14, para II.B.58 (emphasis added).
123 Ibidem, para. II.19.
124 Kevin Mgwanga Gumne et al vs Cameroon, Communication 266/2003, (2009), 26th Activity Report, 
Annex IV, para. 206.
125 Idem.
126 Idem.
127 Kenneth Good vs Republic of Botswana, Communication 313/05, (2010), 28th Activity Report, Annex 
IV, para 218.
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Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised 
and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic 
group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social 
origin, fortune, birth or other status.
Relying on comparative human rights law, the Commission has stated that a violation 
of the principle of non-discrimination arises if equal cases are treated in a different 
manner; and such a difference in treatment does not have an objective and reasonable 
justification; and if there is no proportionality between the aim sought and the means 
employed.128 The Commission has further stated that to determine whether one has 
been the victim of discrimination or not, the allegation has to be weighed against the 
three tests set above:
Was there equal treatment? If not, was the differential treatment justifiable? Was the aim 
of the difference in treatment proportionate to the aim sought and means employed? These 
three benchmarks are cumulative requirements and hence the non-compliance with any of 
the three requirements makes a treatment discriminatory.129
It can be discerned from the Commission’s jurisprudence that State Parties to the 
African Charter have a general obligation not only to refrain from discrimination 
on the prohibited grounds130 but also to take temporary special measures in favour 
of marginalised groups, which suffer historical or persistent prejudice in order to 
attenuate or suppress conditions that perpetuate discrimination.131 As the Commission 
has clearly stated, ‘in certain cases, positive discrimination or affirmative action helps 
to redress imbalance’.132
It is to be noted that discrimination constitutes any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference or other differential treatment that is directly or indirectly 
based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination and which has the intention or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by everyone, 
on an equal footing, of all the rights and freedoms protected in the African Charter.133 
128 Ibidem, para. 219, citing Marckx vs Belgium (6833/74) [1979] ECHR 2 (13 June 1979); Proposed 
Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory opinion 
oc-4/84, January 19, 1984, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984) para. 57; Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination, uN Doc. uN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 
at 26 (1994), para. 13.
129 Kenneth Good vs Botswana, supra. note 127, para. 222.
130 See e.g. Communication No. 159/96, supra. note 39.
131 Communication No. 276/2003, supra note 68, para. 196. Article 18(4) of the African Charter 
specifically states: ‘The aged and the disabled shall also have the right to special measures of 
protection in keeping with their physical or moral needs’.
132 Communication No. 276/2003, supra note 68, para. 196.
133 Communication No. 245/2002, supra note 116, para. 170. For similar definitions see International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), 660 uNTS 
195, entered into force 4 January 1969, Article 1; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), uN Doc. A/34/46, entered into force 3 September 1981, 
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It is not limited to the specific grounds listed above in Article 2 but also includes 
another general ground – ‘other status’ – given that the ‘nature of discrimination 
varies according to context and evolves over time’.134 Thus, the Commission has 
accepted that ‘other status’ includes ‘disability, age or sexual orientation’,135 grounds of 
discrimination not explicitly mentioned in Article 2. There seems to be no good reason 
why ‘other status’ should also not include grounds such as marital and family status, 
gender identity, health status, place of residence, economic and social situation.
3.1.4. Extraterritorial Obligations
Although the realisation of ESC rights under the African Charter essentially has a 
State territorial scope, it is important to note that State obligations under the African 
Charter may have extraterritorial application. This is because unilateral or joint 
acts or omissions of States increasingly have effects, positively or negatively, on the 
progressive realisation of ESC rights in other States. Despite this reality, the African 
Commission (just like other international bodies monitoring ESC Rights e.g. the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)136 has never clarified the notion 
of extraterritorial scope of State Party obligations under the African Charter. When, 
for example, would a State have a duty to a person in another State to take positive 
actions to fulfil his or her rights? And when could that person’s ESC rights violations 
be held to come within the responsibility of another State?
When States impose measures (such as economic sanctions) on another State 
which inhibit the ability of the targeted State to meet its human rights obligations, it 
is incumbent on such States to respect ESC rights of vulnerable groups in the affected 
State.137 In this respect the African Commission has accepted that even when States 
acting collectively impose sanctions/embargoes on another State for legitimate reasons 
(e.g. to address a threat to regional or international peace, stability and security) such 
sanctions/embargoes must not be ‘excessive and disproportionate’, ‘indiscriminate’ or 
Article 1; and International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity 
of Persons with Disabilities, uN Doc. A/61/49 (2006), entered into force 3 may 2008, Article 2. See 
also the Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, paras. 6 and 7; and the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20, para. 7.
134 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20, para. 27.
135 Communication 245/2002, supra note 116, para. 169. However, the Commission refused to grant 
observer status to the Coalition of African lesbians allegedly ‘because the activities of the said 
organisation do not promote and protect any of the rights enshrined in the African Charter’. See 
28th Activity Report, para. 33.
136 See Coomans, F., ‘The Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in the Work of the united Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 11 No. 1, 2011, pp. 1–35.
137 CESCR, General Comment 8: The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, uN Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (1997), para. 8.
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‘seek to achieve ends beyond the legitimate purpose’.138 As the African Commission 
has observed:
Sanctions therefore cannot be open-ended, the effects thereof must be carefully monitored, 
measures must be adopted to meet the basic needs of the most vulnerable populations or 
they must be targeted at the main perpetrators or authors of the nuisance complained 
of.139
The above makes sense since clearly the inhabitants of a given State do not forfeit 
their basic ESC rights by virtue of any determination that their leaders have violated 
norms relating to international peace and security. Therefore every State Party to the 
African Charter has to undertake an impact assessment to determine the possible 
consequences of its policies such as foreign trade policies and agreements on the 
enjoyment of ESC rights in the affected States.
3.2. ToWARDS oBlIGATIoNS FoR NoN-STATE ACToRS
Human rights violations could emanate from the State or from non-State actors 
(NSAs). In the absence of the imposition of direct human rights obligations on NSAs 
for human rights violations in the African Charter, the African Commission has 
emphasised the State duty to ‘protect’ against human rights violations by NSAs.140 
The Commission has taken a broad definition of NSAs as including ‘individuals, 
organisations, institutions and other bodies acting outside the State and its organs’.141 
According to the Commission NSAs:
are not limited to individuals since some perpetrators of human rights abuses are 
organisations, corporations or other structures of business and finance, as the research 
on the human rights impacts of oil production or the development of power facilities 
demonstrates.142
The Commission has recognised the fact that ‘States as well as non-state actors, have 
been known to violate the right to life’.143 Such violations are certainly not restricted 
to the right to life but extend to other human rights. For example, discrimination 
is frequently encountered from individuals and entities in the private sphere such 
138 Association Pour la Sauvegarde de la Paix au Burundi vs Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire 
and Zambia, Communication No. 157/96 (2003), 17th Activity Report, para. 75.
139 Idem.
140 Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertes vs Chad, Communication 74/92 (1995), 
9th Activity Report; Association of Victims of Post Electoral Violence & Interights vs Cameroon, 
Communication 272/2003, 27th Activity Report, Annex 3.
141 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum vs Zimbabwe, supra note 116, para. 136.
142 Ibidem.
143 Communication Nos. 279/03 & 296/05, supra note 67, para. 148.
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as in families, workplaces, and other sectors of society. NSAs in the private housing 
sector (e.g. private landlords and private credit providers) may directly or indirectly 
deny access to housing or mortgages on the basis of ethnicity, marital status, disability 
or other status while some families may refuse to send female children to school or 
higher education.144
Accordingly, every State Party to the African Charter is obliged to protect persons 
‘within its jurisdiction’ from human rights violations by NSAs.145 The reference to 
‘ jurisdiction’ is significant because it extends State obligations to protect against 
human rights violations by NSAs both to territories over which a State Party has 
sovereignty and to those over which that state exercises territorial jurisdiction. Thus, 
State responsibility under the African Charter can, for example, be incurred by a State’s 
omissions to regulate the conduct of NSAs which lead to human rights violations 
outside a State’s territory. This implies that a State can be found to be in violation of 
its obligations under the African Charter for actions taken by it extraterritorially, in 
relation to anyone within the power, effective control or authority of that State, as well 
as within an area over which that State exercises effective overall control.
This recognition is crucial because it raises the question of how NSAs should be 
held accountable for direct violations of human rights treaties. The approach of the 
Commission has been to attribute responsibility for human rights violations by NSAs 
to the State. For example, in Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum vs Zimbabwe146 
the Commission noted that an act by a private individual (or non-State actor) and 
therefore not directly imputable to a State, can generate responsibility of the State, 
not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of ‘due diligence’ on the part of 
the State to prevent the violation or for not taking the necessary steps to provide the 
victims with reparation. The Commission explained that under the ‘due diligence’ 
obligation, ‘States must prevent, investigate and punish acts which impair any of 
the rights recognised under international human rights law’.147 The Commission 
concluded that what would otherwise be wholly private conduct is transformed into a 
constructive act of State, ‘because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation 
or respond to it as required by the [African Charter]’.148 It asserted that a failure to 
exercise ‘due diligence’ to prevent or remedy violation, or a failure to apprehend the 
individuals committing human rights violations gives rise to State responsibility even 
if committed by private individuals.149
Similarly, in the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions vs The Sudan,150 the 
Commission stated that it agreed with the uN Committee Against Torture in Hijrizi 
144 CESCR, General Comment No. 20, para. 11.
145 Communication Nos. 279/03 & 296/05, supra note 67, para. 148.
146 Communication 245/2002, supra note 116, para. 143.
147 Ibidem, para. 145.
148 Ibidem, para. 144.
149 Ibidem, para. 145.
150 Communication Nos. 279/03 & 296/05, (2009), supra note 65.
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vs Yugoslavia that forced evictions and destruction of housing carried out by NSAs 
amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, if the State fails to 
protect the victims from such a violation of their human rights.151 Relying on the uN 
Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons 
(Pinhero Principles),152 the Commission confirmed that ‘States shall take steps to 
ensure that no one is subjected to displacement by either State or non State actors’.153
Recent human rights treaties in Africa have taken into account the Commission’s 
jurisprudence on the State responsibility to ‘ensure’ accountability of NSAs. For 
example, Article 3 of the Au Convention for the Protection and Assistance of 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) oblige States to:
a. Ensure individual responsibility for acts of arbitrary displacement, in accordance 
with applicable domestic and international criminal law;
b. Ensure the accountability of non-State actors concerned, including multinational 
companies and private military or security companies, for acts of arbitrary 
displacement or complicity in such acts;
c. Ensure the accountability of non-State actors involved in the exploration and 
exploitation of economic and natural resources leading to displacement.
States may discharge the above obligation by enacting legislation to apply human 
rights obligations against NSAs so that suits can be brought directly against such 
actors in national courts. For example, the ancient uS statute, the Alien Tort Claims 
Act 1789 (ATCA), which confers upon uS federal district courts original jurisdiction 
over ‘any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations’ wherever it may have taken place, has led to some significant litigation.154 
In one case against Shell for complicity in human rights violations in Nigeria, Shell 
settled the case for a sum of uS$ 15.5 million in 2009.155 However, it should be noted 
the emphasis on State obligations to ensure the accountability of NSAs is inadequate 
in the era of globalisation because of three main reasons.
First, NSAs (in particular multinational companies, many of which have 
multimillion projects) in the era of globalisation operate from multiple jurisdictions, 
which will not always ensure that they are held accountable for human rights 
violations. Indeed, developing States in Africa competing for foreign direct investment 
have shown limited inclination to develop accountability for corporate abuses of ESC 
rights. Second, the privatisation of sectors such as heath, education, prisons and the 
151 Communication No. 161/2000, uN Doc. CAT/C/29/D/161/2000 (2 December 2002); CoHRE case, 
supra note 66, para. 159.
152 uN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17 (28 June 2005), Annex, para. 5.4.
153 CoHRE case, (2009), supra note 65, para. 203.
154 28 uSC 1350.




supply of water, gas and electricity place more public or governmental functions into 
the hands of NSAs in a large number of countries. This has increased the potential of 
NSAs to violate human rights especially of vulnerable groups such as poor women as 
long as governments do not hold them accountable.156 Third, Africa has experienced 
a growth in the number and proportion of internal armed conflicts and, in some 
cases, some organised armed groups control or aspire to control territory and the 
populations therein.
In the above context, while the State-based approach is commendable in 
reaffirming the State obligation to protect against human rights violations by NSAs 
against vulnerable groups such as IDPs, its effectiveness depends on the ability of a 
particular State to hold NSAs responsible for human rights violations at a domestic 
level. However, this is not always possible such as in situations of internal armed 
conflicts leading to the fragmentation of States as NSAs take control of territory 
and populations. For example, the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia is 
currently unable, on its own, to ensure accountability for human rights abuses against 
civilians (including indiscriminate attacks against civilians leading to significant 
displacement of the population) by non-State armed opposition groups, principally 
Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, without the international concerted efforts to tackle 
decades of impunity in Somalia.157
Where a State is unable to hold NSAs responsible for human rights violations, 
it is not only desirable but also essential to hold such actors directly responsible 
for violations of the African Charter. This can be realised by imposing direct legal 
obligations on NSAs to complement existing State obligations by way of a Protocol to 
the African Charter. under the Protocol NSAs in Africa should increasingly support 
and respect human rights and make sure that they are not complicit in human rights 
abuses. It is likely that such a protocol will be ratified by NSAs to protect reputation, 
gain international legitimacy, enhance attractiveness to employees, and reduce risk 
of disruption through protests. In this context, it might be possible to bring actions 
directly against the relevant NSAs and seek appropriate remedies directly against these 
actors. While individuals and small businesses would still be excluded, it is still possible 
to hold individuals, even when acting as part of the organs of the State, independently 
responsible for certain actions such as international crimes (e.g. war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide) amounting to serious violations of the African 
Charter. This could be done by empowering the African Court with jurisdiction to 
156 See e.g. Brown, R., ‘unequal Burden: Water Privatisation and Women’s Human Rights in Tanzania’, 
Gender and Development, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2010, pp. 59–67.
157 See Bari, S., Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, A/
HRC/13/65 (23 march 2010), para. 105; Kelly, K., ‘Al-Shabaab a Threat to East African Countries’, 
The East African, 17 September 2010.
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prosecute international crimes in Africa which would be complementary to national 
jurisdictions.158
4. CoNCluSIoN
Despite the initial reluctance to develop the normative content of ESC rights under the 
African Charter and the corresponding human rights obligations for States and NSAs, 
by and large, the jurisprudence of the African Commission since 2001 has displayed 
advances in the field of ESC rights. Although long delays have generally continued to 
characterise the Commission’s complaints’ procedure, the Commission has made a 
generous and progressive interpretation of the African Charter which confirms that 
ESC rights are justiciable, subject only to restricted limitations. In the words of the 
Commission: ‘any limitations on rights must be proportionate to a legitimate need, 
and should be the least restrictive measures possible’.159 According to the Commission, 
Article 27(2) of the African Charter provides the only ‘legitimate reasons’ for the 
general limitation of the rights and freedoms under the Charter.160 The Commission 
has also held that the rights protected under the African Charter including ESC rights 
are non-derogable during emergencies or special circumstances.161
The Commission has read into the Charter some important ESC rights in particular 
the rights to adequate housing, food, social security, water and sanitation; and adopted 
the Pretoria Statement on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights in Africa in 2004 and 
the Draft Principles and Guidelines on ESC Rights in 2010 elaborating the substantive 
provisions of the Charter on ESC rights. In this process the Commission has expanded 
the scope of ESC rights under the African Charter. However, the current discrepancy 
between the explicit wording of the Charter and its interpretation by the Commission 
leaves the Charter exposed as an ‘outdated document in need of revision to ensure 
that it actually says, loud and clear, what it has been interpreted by the Commission 
to say’.162
158 See Au Assembly’s Decision on the meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/Au/13(XIII), 13th ordinary Session, 1–3 July 2009, 
Sirte, Great Socialist People’s libyan Arab Jamahiriya, para. 5.
159 COHRE Case, supra note 65, para. 214.
160 Communication Nos. 279/03 & 296/05, (2009), supra note 65, para.165. Article 27(2) provides that 
the rights and freedoms of each individual ‘shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, 
collective security, morality and common interest’.
161 See e.g. Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertes vs Chad, Communication No. 
74/92, (1995), 9th Activity Report, para. 21; Malawi African Association and Others vs Mauritania, 
Communication Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97–196/97 and 210/98, (2000), 13th Activity Report, 
Annex V, para. 84; and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions vs The Sudan, Communication Nos. 
279/03 & 296/05, supra note 65, paras. 165 and 167.
162 See Heyns, C., ‘The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter’, Penn State Law 
Review, Vol. 108, No. 3, 2003–2004, pp. 679–702, at p. 691.
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The Commission has found violations of ESC rights in almost all admissible cases. 
Its decisions have evolved from less detailed decisions finding violations without 
elaborating on the normative content of ESC rights into fully reasoned decisions 
drawing on international human rights jurisprudence. Increasingly, the Commission 
has made detailed ‘recommendations’ as remedies for victims of ESC rights violations 
directed at States found in violation of ESC rights.163 Its recent practice further 
requires States to report on the implementation of its ‘recommendations’ within a 
defined period of time. This is included in the Commission’s Activity Reports. This 
development is a significant step forward towards a more effective mechanism for 
the adjudication of ESC rights violations. It is hoped that the African Court would 
complement the Commission’s protective mandate in the future to develop a coherent 
body of ESC rights jurisprudence in Africa. The potential benefit of the supplementary 
role of the African Court was demonstrated in march 2011 when the Court, responding 
to a referral by the Commission, ordered provisional measures against libya.164
The Commission’s jurisprudence emphasises that ESC rights are indivisible, 
interdependent and interrelated with other human rights. As the Commission stated 
‘there is no right in the African Charter that cannot be made effective’.165 In this 
respect, the Commission has lived up to the expectation of the African Charter which, 
in the Commission’s own words:
[…] departs from the narrow formulations of other regional and universal human rights 
instruments by weaving a tapestry which includes the three “generations” of rights: civil and 
political rights; economic, social, and cultural rights; and group and peoples’ rights.166
This provides a potential legal vehicle to challenge policies contributing to human 
rights violations in Africa, such as poverty and inappropriate resources allocation. The 
real challenge remains how to implement ESC rights. It is now up to NGos, National 
Human Rights Institutions, activists, lawyers, universities and other members of civil 
society to support the Commission’s jurisprudence on ESC rights and further explore 
coherent and strategic ways and means in which ESC rights may become a reality in 
the lives of individuals and groups in order ‘to achieve a better life for the peoples of 
Africa’.167 This may be achieved through, inter alia, coordinated efforts to enhance 
the interaction among all the actors concerned, including the various components of 
civil society by increasing public awareness of ESC rights, advocating for legislative 
reform, increased budgetary allocation to ESC rights and the effective use of available 
163 See e,g. Communication Nos. 279/03 & 296/05, supra note 65, para. 229.
164 See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights vs Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiliya, Application No. 004/2011, available at: www.african-court.org/fileadmin/documents/
Court/Cases/order_for_Provisinal_measures_against_libya.PDF.
165 Communication 155/96, supra note 63, para. 68.
166 COHRE Case, supra note 65, at para. 149. See also the African Charter, supra note 1, Preamble, para. 
7.
167 African Charter, supra note 1, Preamble.
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resources, as well as increased litigation of strategic ESC rights cases at national and 
international levels.
It is clear from the Commission’s decisions that States are obliged to ‘respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil’ all ESC rights explicitly protected in the Charter and 
those implied in the Charter. It can also be arguably stated that the State obligation to 
‘fulfil’ ESC rights under the Charter is subject to ‘available resources’ (within a State 
and from international assistance/cooperation) given that many African States are 
generally faced with the problem of poverty. In order to implement State obligations 
as developed in the Commission’s jurisprudence under the African Charter ESC 
rights should not be relegated to non-justiciable directive principles of State policy in 
the domestic law of all African States parties to the African Charter.
Given that the African Charter complements human rights protection at the 
domestic level where the rights protected in the Charter should be realised, African 
States should ensure that the ESC rights protected in the African Charter are given 
full legal effect in domestic law, that the Charter rights are made justiciable, and 
that effective remedies (e.g. compensation, reparation, restitution, rehabilitation, 
guarantees of non-repetition, and public apologies) are available for victims of all 
violations of ESC rights at the domestic level. In this respect, it is essential to adopt 
domestic legislation to give ESC rights the same level of protection given to civil and 
political rights since this is indispensable in complying with State obligations under 
Articles 1 and 2 of the African Charter.168 The direct incorporation of international 
human rights treaties into domestic law would enhance the legal protection of human 
rights. The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011 provides a 
recent good example. Its Article 9(3) provides that: ‘All rights and freedoms enshrined 
in international human rights treaties, covenants and instruments ratified or acceded 
to by the Republic of South Sudan shall be an integral part of this Bill [of Rights]’.
168 See e.g. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Chapter 
A9, laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. Section 1 of this Act provides that the provisions of 
the African Charter shall ‘have force of law in Nigeria and shall be given full recognition and effect 
and be applied by all authorities and persons exercising legislative, executive or judicial powers 
in Nigeria’. See also Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project vs Nigeria, Communication 
300/2005, paras. 65–69, (2008), 25th Activity Report.
